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Abstract This paper offers estimates of the underreporting of income by self-
employed workers using the Spanish household surveys over the period 2006–2009.
We replicate the well-known approach by Pissarides and Weber (J Public Econ
39(1):17–32, 1989) but extending its interpretation for admitting also the conceal-
ment of income by salary workers. Our results show that the reported income by
self-employed has to be increased by about 25 % to obtain the level of income which
would equal the level of underreporting by employees. Our estimates are robust to
changes in specification, endogeneity and non-linearities.
Keywords Underreporting · Household surveys · Food consumption · Tax evasion
JEL Classification D12 · H26 · O17
1 Introduction
One of the most extended ways of tax evasion is that related to the underreporting
of income by self-employed workers. As long as their incomes are not subject to
third-party reporting, the probability of being detected by the tax authorities in case
of hiding earnings is lower than in the case of salary workers, and this leads to higher
levels of tax evasion. This acquires more relevance in a country like Spain, where the
high levels of unemployment clearly affect the individual’s decisions to work in the
underground economy (Ahn and De la Rica 1997), and the lack of flexible enough
rules in the labor markets may encourage the informal economy (Bentolila et al. 1994).
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As other phenomena of tax evasion, the first challenge to approach it lies in the
difficulty of measuring the extent of such concealment. The standard method is based
on the seminal paper by Pissarides and Weber (1989), which uses the Engel curves for
food demand. The underlying idea is simple. Both salary and self-employed workers
report accurately their food expenditures in household budget surveys. By contrast,
when they are asked about their earnings, only the salary workers say their true income.
The estimate of underreporting of income by the self-employed workers is then given
by the comparison of food expenditures of both groups in function of declared income,
given other economic and demographic characteristics. A detailed explanation of this
method is provided in the next section.
On this basis, a number of papers have offered estimates of underreporting for differ-
ent samples. In essence, what is computed is the number by which the reported income
of self-employed has to be multiplied to obtain the true income. For the UK econ-
omy, Pissarides and Weber (1989) give a central value of 1.55 in 1982. From another
point of view, Lyssiotou et al. (2004), using a complete demand system approach and
non-parametric estimation methods, suggest that the extent of underreporting by self-
employed workers in the UK in 1993 goes from 118 % for households with head in
blue collar occupation to 64 % for white collar jobs.
With data of Canada, Schuetze (2002) finds, for some years between 1969 and 1992,
estimates that go from 11 to 23 % as average values of lower and upper bound estimates,
respectively. For the period 1994–1996, Johansson (2005) gives a range of estimates
between 16 and 40 % of underreporting in Finland, depending on the definition used for
the self-employed household. More recently, Engstrom and Holmlund (2009) conclude
that the Swedish households with at least one self-employed member underreport their
income by around 30 % in early 2000s. And Hurst et al. (2011), using three data samples
for the US in the 80s, 90s and early 2000s, estimate the degree of underreporting by
between 25 and 35 %.
From the very beginning of this literature, most of papers assume that employees do
not hide part of their income and underreporting is exclusively concentrated on self-
employed workers. But this simplifying assumption is weak from both theoretical
(see, for instance, Kolm and Nielsen (2008), for a model with concealment of income
by firms and salary workers) and empirical points of view. In this sense, the 2007
Eurobarometer shows that 5 % of all dependant employees in a representative sample
of individuals in the EU admitted having received all or part of their salary as envelope
or cash-in-hand wages.1
Our own sample shows a number of indications leading to think that also the
salary workers partly hide their earnings. For instance, about 12 % of households
declaring that the main source of their income is on their own (“cuenta propia”)
classify themselves as salary workers. Furthermore, the number of employees that
do not inform on their monthly income in the survey is about twice than that of
respondents (obviously, this figure is higher in the case of self-employed workers—
about three times—but both of them may reveal concealment of income).
1 National values of this percentage range from 23 % of Romania to 1 % of UK. Spain has the same figure
than the EU as a whole; however, when the criterion is the number of hours spent on undeclared work,
Spain is clearly above the European average.
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This paper applies the methodology by Pissarides and Weber (1989) to get an
estimation of the extent of underreporting by the Spanish self-employed over the
period 2006–2009. Our data come from the Spanish Household Budget Surveys. The
robustness of our results has been checked using alternative specifications, testing for
non-linearities in the relationship between income and food expenditure, and dealing
with potential problems of endogeneity. Different measures of the key variables have
been examined as well.
In this context, we can summarize the main contributions of the paper as follows.
Firstly, we replicate the well-known approach of estimating food demand functions for
making explicit a measure of concealment of income in a sample that has never been
exploited in this regard, with the particular characteristics of the Spanish case in terms
of data, the period considered and others. Secondly, the interpretation of the results
considers the possibility that the salary workers also conceal part of their incomes; in
fact, this can be seen not only as a realistic assumption but also as a reasonable reading
of our findings.
After the Introduction, we set up the theoretical framework used to measure the
extent of underreporting of income. Section 3 explains the main features of data and the
criteria followed to build the sample. Section 4 gives details of estimation procedures
and shows the results. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section aims to build an analytical framework to estimate the degree of under-
reporting of income by households with self-employed workers as household heads.
The approach used here is based on the following main assumptions: (i) Food expen-
ditures are correctly reported by households in budget surveys; but (ii) this not the
case of income. Previous studies have qualified this second assumption setting that
salary workers are completely honest by reporting their income while self-employed
workers hide part of their earnings. However, we really think that a most adjusted pic-
ture to the real world involves salary workers (at least some of them) that also conceal
partially their income, although in a lower degree than self-employed workers. Con-
sequently, a natural test for measuring the relative extent of such a underreporting by
self-employed workers consists of comparing food demand functions—which depend
on income—of both groups.
Our starting point is the model by Pissarides and Weber (1989), which we shall hold
almost in its totality but introducing the chance of underreporting by salary workers.
This innovation not only allows to keep manageable the empirical estimation but also
to broaden the interpretation of the results. Particularly, our measure of underreporting
by self-employed will be a relative measure which takes as reference a given level (and
strictly positive) of hidden income by salary workers.
Let Yi be the true income of household i . We shall distinguish two types of house-
holds, denoted by SW and SE , which refer to salary worker and self-employed worker
households, respectively. As usual in the definition of consumption functions, a rela-
tion between the observable income Yi and the permanent income Y
p
i has to be set up:
Yi = pi Y pi , (1)
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where pi is a random variable to take into consideration the deviations of observable
income from its permanent, long-run value. It is assumed that the mean of pi is the
same for all the households in the economy but the variance of pi to be higher for
self-employed households than for salary workers. This can be seen as a reasonable
assumption as long as self-employed workers face more risks and, consequently, a
more volatile income is to be expected in their case.
Let Y ′i be the disposable income reported by households in budget expenditure
surveys. As said before, previous papers have assumed that salary workers report cor-
rectly all their income. In our framework, by contrast, and using a slight modification
of the Pissarides and Weber’s model, we will allow the phenomenon of underreporting
of income also for salary workers. True income Yi and reported income Y ′i are related
as follows:
Yi = ki Y ′i , with ki > 1. (2)
ki is a random variable that indicates to what extent household i hides part of her true
income Yi . In other words, ki is the number by which the reported income Y ′i must
be multiplied so as to get the true income Yi . Both types of workers hide part of their
income but in a different proportion: kSE > kSW , that is, self-employed households
underreport more disposable income than salary households.
Combining Eqs. (1) and (2), and after logarithmical transformation, the log of
permanent income is:
ln Y pi = ln Y
′
i − ln pi + ln ki , (3)
which becomes one of the key variables by estimating the following food expenditure
function:
ln Fi = αX′ + β ln Y pi + εi , (4)
where Fi is the food expenditure of household i , α is a vector of parameters common
to salary and self-employed worker households, X is a vector of household charac-
teristics, β is a scalar that can be interpreted as the marginal propensity to consume
food, and εi is a white noise. In a sense, what expression (4) represents is a log-linear
Engel curve for food consumption.
At this point, the main caveat by estimating the above Engel curve is that we have
no data on pi and ki (in fact, the latter is the measure of underreporting that we are
looking for). Thus, we need to make some assumptions on their distribution over the
sample. As is usual in literature, we set up:
ln pi = μpi + ui (5)
ln ki = μki + vi , (6)
that is, both variables are log-normal distributed, with particular values of μp and μk
for salary and self-employed workers. Disturbances ui and vi are assumed to have
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zero means and constant (but differentiated among both types of workers) variances




Substituting (5) and (6) into (3), and in turn into (4), we get:
ln Fi = αX′ + β ln Y ′i − β(μpi − μki ) − β(ui − vi ) + εi . (7)
When this Engel curve is adjusted with a dummy variable to reflect the appropriate
distribution of k and p across groups i = SE, SW , one finds
ln Fi = αX′ + β ln Y ′i − β(μpSW + DSEi (μpSE − μpSW )
−(μkSW + DSEi (μkSE − μkSW ))) + ηi ,
where DSEi is dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the household head of family
i is self-employed worker and 0 if salary worker, and ηi is the error of regression
that, by construction, includes not only unexplained variations in household food
expenditures but also deviations of their actual income from its permanent income
and of their reported income from their true income. The estimation of this equation










ki = μki +
1
2
σ 2vi , (9)
where a bar over a variable denotes its mean. Assuming that the mean of pi is the
same for salary and self-employed workers (ln
−
pSE = ln −pSW ), after substituting for
μ
p
SE − μpSW , the above Engel curve can be written as
ln Fi = αX′i + β ln Y ′i + γ DSEi + ηi , (10)









σ 2uSE − σ 2uSW
)]
and θ = ln −k SE − ln
−
k SW .
As can be seen from the expression which relates γ, β and θ , the extent of under-
reporting of income estimated is an interval whose limits depend upon the extreme
values for variances of u and v in each type of household. The usual approach to get
estimates of such as variances involves the computation of residual variances in the
following regression for income:
ln Y ′i = X′i + Z′i + ξi , (11)
where Zi is a vector of variables used as instruments in IV-2SLS estimates of expres-
sion (10), given the potential endogeneity of Y ′i . Again, the error term ξi has three
components: unexplained variations in household permanent income, deviations of
their actual income from its permanent income and deviations of their reported income
from their true income. If the first component is assumed to be the same in both the
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salary and self-employed workers—which seems to be a reasonable assumption given
that the risks of omitting variables related to the distinction between self-employed
versus salary workers are null when a dummy is included or a separate estimation by
type of household is considered—, we can write
σ 2ξSE − σ 2ξSW = σ 2uSE + σ
2
vSE
− 2cov(uv)SE − σ 2uSW − σ 2vSW + 2cov(uv)SW . (12)
On the other hand, given the value of γ above, the relative underreporting of income






− σ 2uSE + σ 2uSW − σ 2vSW ). (13)
Note that (13) is quite similar to the expression (18) of Pissarides and Weber (1989),
where the level of underreporting of income by salary workers is fixed at zero, and
consequently the term σ 2vSW does not appear. If we set up that the covariance between
u and v are null for both types of households, lower and upper bounds for the rela-
tive underreporting of income by self-employed households are obtained.2 Taken the
variances for salary workers as parameters, we see that the minimum value for θ is









(σ 2ξSE − σ 2ξSW ), (14)
where (12) has been used. By contrast, it is easy to see that (13) reaches its maximum
value when σ 2uSE is at its minimum feasible value, which in our model is like in
Pissarides and Weber (1989): σ 2uSE = σ 2uSW .3 This gives an upper bound for the extent





(σ 2ξSE − σ 2ξSW ) (15)
Given the fact that salary workers also partially hide their income, the interpreta-
tion of these lower, central and upper values of the degree of underreporting differs
from those of Pissarides and Weber (1989)’s approach as long as we have explicitly
taken into consideration the likely concealment of income by employees. In essence,
our approach closely follows that of Pissarides and Weber (1989): we estimate their
standard food demand functions but our interpretation of the results is consistent with
the fact that the underreporting of income by self-employed households is in rela-
tion to a given degree of underreporting of income by salary workers. Section 4 shall
offer empirical evidence reinforcing this point as long as the extent of concealment
2 As Pissarides and Weber (1989) show, alternative assumptions on partial correlation coefficient between
u and v have not a significant impact on estimates of underreporting.
3 There is an erratum at this point in p. 26 of Pissarides and Weber (1989); using their notation, they write
σ 2uSE = σ 2uSE when it should be σ 2uSE = σ 2uE E .
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by self-employed will dramatically hinge upon the particular group of salary worker
households used in the comparison.
3 The data
The data used are drawn from the Spanish Household Budget Surveys (EPF in Spanish)
from 2006 to 2009 elaborated by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE in
Spanish). The sample size is approximately 24,000 households per year, with half of
the sample renewed each year.4 The food consumption expenditures registered in the
EPF refer to both the monetary flow on the payment of certain goods and the value
of the consumption made by the households in terms of self-consumption and self-
supply as well. In this paper, we work with the sum of both of them not only because
the econometric estimates become worse if self-consumption and self-supply are not
taken into account but also due to the differences between salary and self-employed
workers in these items.5
In a number of cases (about 25 % of households), the INE makes imputations
in food expenditures to correct missing values, errors, absence of answer, etc. Our
estimates distinguish these two different situations. Anyway, the differences between
self-employed workers and salary workers in the percentage of imputation over the
total food expenditures are practically null.6 We also show results with and without
meals away home included in the household food expenditures.
There are two variables of interest regarding the household income in the EPF. The
first is the net (after taxes) income of household as a whole and the second is the net
income of the household head. Both of them are measured in nominal terms. Since
both food expenditures and household incomes as nominal variables could be subject
to the effect of price changes, we have deflated the former using the food CPI and
the latter using the GDP deflator. Estimates only change insignificantly, thus we have
decided to report here only the regressions with nominal data.
In a high number of cases (around 70 % for salary workers and almost 80 % of
self-employed workers), the INE makes imputations of the monthly net total income
received by the households. This is because a huge number of households do not
inform about how much they earn. All these observations based on imputed values
have been removed in our sample. This is not the case of net income of the household
head, where all the data available here come from the answers of participants.
Salary worker household is defined as that in which the household head is self-
reported as salary worker and the corresponding for self-employed worker household.
Other criteria have been considered in this key distinction (such as the main source of
income for the households) in order to avoid a number of inconsistencies.7 As is usual
4 Details on the methodology followed by the INE can be seen at http://www.ine.es/en/daco/daco42/
daco4213/resmeto06_en.pdf.
5 The difference between the broad concept of food expenditures and the narrower monetary flow of
expenditures is double for self-employed workers when comparing to salary workers.
6 For the sake of simplicity, we only report here estimates with no imputations in food expenditures.
7 For instance, a high number of household heads auto-classified as salary workers declare receive no
income from firms or government as payment of their labor.
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Table 1 Differences between SE and SW households in food expenditure and income
SE SW t test on equality of means
Ln (food w/o meals out) 8.17 (0.70) 8.15 (0.74) 0.12 (0.56)
Ln (food) 8.73 (0.68) 8.73 (0.65) −1.20 (0.89)
Ln (net household income) 9.64 (0.68) 9.80 (0.61) 9.39 (0.00)
Ln (net household head income) 9.30 (0.58) 9.52 (0.51) 14.56 (0.00)
Standard deviations between parentheses except in column (3) where p value of H0: equality of means
in this type of papers, families in which the household head works in agriculture,
cattle farming or fishing have been removed from the sample; this way, we aim at
avoiding that the relationship between food consumption and income to be affected
by the particular consumption pattern of these households.
It is not straightforward to set up a clear correspondence between our data and those
from other statistical sources. Unfortunately, the Spanish National Accounts do not
distinguish between self-employed and salary workers in terms of the primary genera-
tion and allocation of income. However, we can see how the composition of our sample
is closely similar to that of Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS; EPA in
Spanish). While the shares of self-employed and salary workers over total of non-
agricultural jobs are respectively about 15 and 84 % in the EAPS, the corresponding
weights in our sample are 17 and 82 %.
Table 1 shows the main intuition behind this paper. Households whose head is a self-
employed worker declare to spend in food practically the same than the households
headed by a salary worker. But households with a self-employed head systematically
always report less income in the EPF than the corresponding salary worker house-
holds. These differences are statistical significant (column (3)). In line with previous
research, this is a clear indication that self-employed households underreport part of
their income.8 On the other hand, standard deviations of income (whatever the defin-
ition used) is always higher in the case of self-employed households than in the case
of salary worker households, reflecting a positive sign for the difference σ 2ξSE − σ 2ξSW ;
this is compatible with a more volatile pattern for self-employed income, as we set up
in the theoretical framework.9
As we are interested in isolating the effect of the self-employed condition on the
extent of underreporting, we need to control for the factors which are involved in deter-
mining the food demand function of both groups. Table 2 gives information about some
economic and demographic variables with some expected impact on household food
8 In a different context but also with data from EPF, the informal economy becomes evident as there exists
an income-expenditure gap. Ratio between total expenditures per household and household income is 1.30
for salary workers and 1.36 for self-employed.
9 A classical test has been carried out to check whether the difference between the standard deviations of
income for salary and self-employed workers are statistically significant or not. The results have been clear:
they are statistically significant. The test has been performed for the household total income and the income
of household head as well.
123
SERIEs (2013) 4:353–371 361
Table 2 Differences in economic and demographic variables between SE and SW households
Variable SE SW
Demographic characteristics
# of members 2.43 (1.20) 2.55 (1.23)
# of dependent children 0.45 (0.84) 0.58 (0.90)
Age of household head 59.43 (16.03) 52.66 (15.78)
# of labor active members 0.93 (0.98) 1.15 (0.94)
Dummy for Spanish nac. 0.95 (0.20) 0.93 (0.23)
Compliance 0.015 (0.16) 0.007 (0.11)
Dummy for male household head 0.72 (0.44) 0.72 (0.44)
Dummy for married household head 0.11 (0.32) 0.18 (0.38)
# of members recipient of income 1.60 (0.73) 1.56 (0.74)
Schooling
Dummy for primary school or less 0.44 (0.49) 0.31 (0.46)
Dummy for secondary school I (16 y.o.) 0.29 (0.45) 0.27 (0.44)
Dummy for secondary school II (18 y.o.) 0.11 (0.31) 0.15 (0.36)
Dummy for University 0.15 (0.36) 0.24 (0.43)
Housing
Dummy for housing-owner with mortgage 0.21 (0.41) 0.31 (0.46)
Dummy for towns <10,000 inhabitants 0.26 (0.44) 0.20 (0.40)
# of others housing owned by household 0.18 (0.43) 0.15 (0.40)
Neighbourhood 3.69 (1.59) 3.56 (1.42)
Other consumptions
Log of food expenditures away home 7.21 (1.43) 7.33 (1.34)
Log of alcoholic drink expenditures 5.69 (1.47) 5.84 (1.46)
Log of durables for housing expenditures 6.07 (1.33) 6.11 (1.37)
Log of durables for leisure expenditures 5.99 (1.54) 6.02 (1.49)
Log of car expenditures 5.51 (2.71) 5.53 (2.76)
Variable “compliance” is defined as the difference between the theoretical records and the actual records
effectively collected in a household. Variable neighbourhood ranges between 1 (luxury urban) and 7 (agrar-
ian rural). All data are with no imputations in food expenditure answers. Standard deviations between
parentheses
expenditures. On this basis we can characterize the average self-employed household
in relation to the salary worker family.
Although the self-employed households consist of less members, dependent chil-
dren and labour active members than the salary worker households, the former have a
slightly higher number of income recipients than the latter. Self-employed households
also are headed by an older person than the corresponding salary worker family, whose
nationality is mainly Spanish and male sex (with very small differences with respect
to the salary worker households). Human capital accumulation is bigger in the case of
employee households.10
10 This is an interesting fact that also occurs in the Swedish case (Engstrom and Holmlund 2009) but not
in the US sample (Hurst et al. 2011).
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Regarding housing characteristics, the average self-employed household lives more
in towns below 10,000 inhabitants, has a less recourse to mortgages, and owns slightly
more houses (other than the main one) when comparing to the average salary worker
household. If other types of expenditures are analysed, the self-employed households
spend less money in alcoholic drinks, meals out of home, cars and durables goods
for housing or leisure than the salary worker households. Finally, the interpretation
of variable “compliance” says that the higher its value, the less the implication of
the household in providing the information required in the survey; in this sense, self-
employed households are less collaborative than employee households.
4 Estimations and results
The model of Sect. 2 suggests an equation which allows us to obtain an estimate of
underreporting of income by self-employed worker households in relation to salary
workers households. In essence, expression (10) states that the food consumption of
both types of households depends on reported income, on a dummy distinguishing
whether the household head of the family is a self-employed worker or not, and a
number of variables controlling for different socio-economic and demographic char-
acteristics.
On the basis of Eq. (10), we have run a number of regressions under several specifi-
cations and methods. Particularly, we report 2SLS estimates in which both the reported
household income and the dummy variable for SE have been instrumented. It is clear,
by assumption, that the first one is measured with error given the existence of tran-
sitory variations around its permanent value and the own concealment phenomenon.
The dummy for self-employed workers is also treated as endogenous as long as we
have evidence of potential misclassification of self-employed households as families
with a salary worker head;11 otherwise, this would likely lead to a downward bias in
the estimated coefficient for self-employed dummy (Schuetze 2002). Not surprisingly,
the Hausman specification test supports the idea that OLS estimates are inconsistent
and the IV approach is required. Selection of instruments has been done using the Sar-
gan test; a complete list of those that have been used can be seen in the Appendix A.
Moreover, the lack of correlations between the disturbances and the unobserved indi-
vidual effects, as also Hausman-type tests show for all the specifications—not reported
here—, leads to a random effects model.
We have used different definitions for the dependent variable: the log of total food
expenditures (food purchases plus meals away home) per household or the log of food
expenditures (only food purchases) per household. Similarly, two measures of income
have been considered: the log of net total income (called in tables total income) or the
log of net income earned by the household head (called HH income).
In all specifications the control variables are the age of household head and its
square, the number of members in the households (or the number of dependant chil-
dren), a dummy for marital status (1 if married, 0 otherwise), a time dummy for 2009,
and a constant. Other specifications were estimated but those reported here are the best
11 Recall the data we provided in the Introduction.
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Table 3 IV estimates of Engel curve for food
ln (food) ln (food) ln (total food) ln (total food)
ln (total income) 0.278 (0.029) 0.423 (0.031)
ln (HH income) 0.325 (0.029) 0.497 (0.030)
DSE 0.062 (0.018) 0.085 (0.018) 0.080 (0.019) 0.093 (0.018)
Age 0.051 (0.002) 0.039 (0.002) 0.034 (0.002) 0.024 (0.002)
Age2 −0.0004 (0.00002) −0.0002 (0.00002) −0.0003 (0.00002) −0.0002 (0.00002)
# Children 0.172 (0.006) 0.093 (0.005)
# Members 0.270 (0.004) 0.207 (0.004)
Marital status −0.340 (0.159) −0.147 (0.014) −0.251 (0.015) −0.094 (0.014)
Time dummy 2009 −0.037 (0.011) −0.041 (0.010) −0.065 (0.010) −0.071 (0.010)
Constant 3.998 (0.279) 3.221 (0.273) 3.686 (0.291) 2.762 (0.278)
∧
θ 1.253 1.300 1.210 1.205
∧
θLower 1.230 1.274 1.190 1.183
∧
θUpper 1.277 1.327 1.230 1.228
−
R2 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.32
Hausman 16.40 [0.01] 13.74 [0.03] 18.48 [0.005] 17.50 [0.007]
Sargan 7.74 [0.17] 10.96 [0.05] 4.81 [0.18] 4.10 [0.39]
Obs. 16,451 16,095 13,475 13,158
Standard errors in parenthesis and p values of H0 between brackets. Total food is the sum of food and
meals away home expenditures HH income is the income of household head and total income the income
of household
ones in terms of econometric guarantees and economic sense. Particularly, regional
dummies, the log of expenditures in clothes, cars, health, and other household spend-
ing items, dummies controlling for the size of the city, and time dummies for others
years were included but they were not statistically significant. Additionally, among
the rejected variables as potential instruments, we have dummies for housing owner-
ship (if financed with a mortgage, if rented), the number of labour active members, a
dummy for sex of household head, the log of durable goods for housing expenditures
and the log of durable goods for leisure expenditures.
Table 3 reports IV estimates of expression (10) and shows that the degree of under-
reporting by the Spanish self-employed workers ranges between 20 and 30 %. Table 3
also displays the lower and upper values of degree of underreporting, according to the
expressions (14) and (15), respectively, and the variances of Table 9 in the Appendix
B.12 Recall that on the basis of standard assumptions, the values for σ 2ξSE and σ
2
ξSW
can be obtained as the residual variances of (11) when a separate estimation for each
type of household is done.
When the dependent variable is the log of food purchases, the concealment of
earnings is higher than in the case of taking into consideration the meals away home
12 Model (1) in Table 9 refers to specification of column (1) in Table 3, and so on.
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as well; it makes sense to find less underreporting when explicit expenditures in bars
and restaurants is regarded, specially as receipts and invoices may be involved. In
the two first columns, we also see higher levels of underreporting when only the
income earned by the self-employment head of household is considered. By contrast,
the concealment of earnings by the households with self-employed head is lower if
we take all the familiar income regardless its sources. In other words, the higher the
share of self-employment income over the total family income, the higher the level of
underreporting.
These results are line with previous papers, although in the low range. Engstrom
and Holmlund (2009), by focussing the difference between underreporting in self-
employed households and underreporting of self-employed income in self-employed
households, see how their estimates of such a measure goes from 30 % to around 35 %
in Sweden. Kleven et al. (2011), using experimental methods, find that evasion rate for
total positive self-employment income is 17.7 % in Denmark while the corresponding
value for third-party reported income (among other things, salary worker incomes) is
below 1 %. Hurst et al. (2011), with a very close methodology to this one, find that the
self-employed workers underreport their income by between 25 and 35 % in the US.
Regarding the impact of control variables on the dependent variable, the results
exhibit reasonable patterns and again similar to previous studies. Food expenditures
are positively affected by the age of household head but negatively by its square;
dummies for marital status of household head and for year 2009, when the economic
crisis was specially hard, have also a negative impact on food expenditure. By contrast,
the number of members or dependant children in the household have a positive effect
on food spending.
One of the contributions of this paper lies in the broader interpretation of the esti-
mates of underreporting by taking into consideration the chance of hiding income
by salary workers too. To what extent changes in the set of salary workers used in
the estimations affect the degree of underreporting by self-employed workers? How
sensitive is this measure with respect to different subsets of salary workers, which in
a sense can be seen as control group? Table 4 gives a suggestive answer by reporting
meaningful differences in the degree of underreporting of income by self-employed
households depending on the group of salary workers with which they are compared
to. When families with salary workers as head receive no pensions, the degree of
concealment found for the self-employed workers is about 45 % more than in the
standard approach (1.809 vs 1.253); by contrast, if the estimates are computed regard-
ing households with salary workers and earnings from pensions as well, the level of
underreporting by self-employed decreases by 11 % in comparison with the standard
estimate (1.111 vs 1.253). Similarly, the extent of hidden earnings by self-employed
notably goes up when salary households with no income from unemployment benefits
are regarded.
These results underline an issue that seems to be relevant for the Spanish case,
namely, that the measures of degree of underreporting by self-employed workers are
in relation to a given level of underreporting by salary workers, which is difficult to be
assumed that is null. On the basis that the employees also hide part of their income,
our estimates of concealment by self-employed workers are relative to these hidden
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Table 4 IV estimates of Engel curve for food and different sets of SW
All SW SW w/o pensions SW & pensions SW w/o unem. ben.
ln (total income) 0.278 (0.029) 0.197 (0.045) 0.312 (0.040) 0.266 (0.032)
DSE 0.062 (0.018) 0.117 (0.027) 0.033 (0.023) 0.099 (0.021)
Age 0.051 (0.002) 0.043 (0.004) 0.058 (0.004) 0.053 (0.002)
Age2 −0.0004 (0.00002) −0.0003 (0.00004) −0.0005 (0.00004) −0.0004 (0.00002)
# Children 0.172 (0.006) 0.185 (0.007) 0.171 (0.015) 0.173 (0.007)
Marital status −0.340 (0.159) −0.385 (0.020) −0.292 (0.023) −0.358 (0.016)
Time dummy 2009 −0.037 (0.011) −0.050 (0.014) −0.027 (0.016) −0.038 (0.011)
Constant 3.998 (0.279) 5.007 (0.408) 3.629 (0.413) 4.082 (0.309)
∧
θ 1.253 1.809 1.111 1.455
−
R2 0.24 0.26 0.23 0.24
Obs. 16,451 9,852 7,971 15,171
Dependent variable: Log of food expenditures by household. Standard errors in parenthesis
earnings by salary workers. Furthermore, these estimates are very sensitive to whether
the households are entitled to receive social benefits or not.
Using individuals’ own assessment of their employment status could be problematic
since there could be workers whose status may not be clear. Although the potential mis-
classification of self-employed households as families with a salary worker head has
been dealt with the above IV approach, we include now an additional check. Column
(1) in Table 5 shows estimates of food expenditure equation but requiring that those
households stating to be self-employed also declare that the income coming from self-
employment is the main one. The degree of underreporting as well as the coefficients
of control variables are practically the same than in the canonical specification.
Substantial differences do arise when the group of self-employed workers is filtered
to take into account some particular, relevant features. Column (2) in Table 5 reports
the level of concealment of income when the self-employed has hired at least one
worker as employee. The central value of θ is 1.428, notably higher than for the
whole sample of self-employed; remaining regressors hardly differ from the previous
ones. This fact is specially intense if the self-employed workers with employees are
technicians or professionals such as lawyers, doctors, architects and so on (column 3
in Table 5); in this case their reported earnings should be multiplied by 2.4 to obtain
the true income, though this result should be interpreted with caution due to the weak
statistical significance of the coefficient for the self-employed dummy. By contrast,
households with skilled self-employed head (and no distinction is now made whether
they have employees or not) are found to underreport less than in the standard case
(1.147 vs 1.253).
Additional robustness analyses have been carried out in order to verify whether the
specification chosen is the most appropriate. Firstly, we have checked the assumption
of equal propensity to consume for self-employed and salary workers. Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 6 report the estimates by regressing the log of food expenditures on both
the income of self-employed and of salary worker households, in terms of household
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Table 5 IV estimates of Engel curve for food with different definitions of SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (total income) 0.282 (0.030) 0.284 (0.030) 0.205 (0.092) 0.480 (0.078)
DSE 0.064 (0.028) 0.101 (0.028) 0.182 (0.112) 0.065 (0.028)
Age 0.050 (0.002) 0.051 (0.002) 0.056 (0.007) 0.054 (0.004)
Age2 −0.0004 (0.00002) −0.0004 (0.00002) −0.0004 (0.00007) −0.0004 (0.00004)
# Children 0.171 (0.006) 0.171 (0.006) 0.159 (0.014) 0.178 (0.011)
Marital status −0.342 (0.016) −0.342 (0.016) −0.443 (0.043) −0.280 (0.031)
Time dummy 2009 −0.038 (0.011) −0.035 (0.011) 0.006 (0.026) −0.049 (0.017)
Constant 3.991 (0.286) 3.959 (0.284) 4.557 (0.848) 1.959 (0.750)
∧
θ 1.254 1.428 2.430 1.147
−
R2 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.23
Obs. 15,621 15,669 3,039 6,447
Dependent variable: Log of food expenditure. Columns: (1): self-employed declaring that the income from
self-employment is the main one; (2): self-employed with employees; (3): professional and technician
self-employed with employees; (4): skilled self-employed. Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 6 IV estimates of Engel curve for food with changes in specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln (total incomeSW ) 0.277 (0.029)
ln (total incomeSE ) 0.284 (0.030)
ln (HH incomeSW ) 0.324 (0.029)
ln (HH incomeSE ) 0.333 (0.030)
ln (total income) −2.250 (4.719)
ln (total income)2 0.129 (0.241)
ln (HH income) −3.731 (5.480)
ln (HH income)2 0.213 (0.288)
DSE 0.052 (0.027) 0.063 (0.035)
Age 0.051 (0.002) 0.039 (0.002) 0.049 (0.005) 0.036 (0.005)
Age2 −0.0004 (0.00002) −0.002 (0.00002) −0.0004 (0.00004) −0.0002 (0.00004)
# Children 0.172 (0.006) 0.166 (0.012)
# Members 0.270 (0.004) 0.269 (0.005)
Marital status −0.340 (0.015) −0.147 (0.014) −0.345 (0.018) −0.154 (0.017)
Time dummy 2009 −0.037 (0.011) −0.041 (0.010) −0.036 (0.011) −0.042 (0.011)
Constant 4.005 (0.279) 3.233 (0.272) 16.360 (23.066) 22.516 (26.065)
−
R2 0.24 0.30 0.22 0.28
Obs. 16,451 16,095 16,451 16,095
Dependent variable: Log of food expenditures. Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 7 Quantile regression of Engel curve for food
q25 q50 q75
ln (total income) 0.256 (0.010) 0.237 (0.006) 0.202 (0.008)
DSE 0.031 (0.023) 0.051 (0.010) 0.040 (0.016)
Age 0.047 (0.003) 0.043 (0.002) 0.038 (0.002)
Age2 −0.0003 (0.00003) −0.0003 (0.00002) −0.0002 (0.00002)
# Members 0.209 (0.005) 0.199 (0.003) 0.183 (0.003)
Marital status (3) 0.272 (0.021) 0.1999 (0.009) 0.152 (0.012)
Time dummy 2009 −0.036 (0.017) −0.038 (0.010) −0.041 (0.010)
Constant 3.280 (0.150) 4.003 (0.109) 4.890 (0.100)
∧
θ 1.132 1.242 1.223
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.20 0.18
Obs. 16,451 16,095 16,451
Dependent variable: Log of food expenditures. Standard errors in parenthesis
income and household head income as well. It is straightforward to see that the dif-
ferences between the two relevant coefficients are negligible, keeping the remaining
coefficients practically unchanged. This result is in line with previous findings by other
authors, for instance Pissarides and Weber (1989).
Regarding the potential existence of non-linear relationships between food con-
sumption and income (Lyssiotou et al. 2004; Tedds 2010; both of them using non-
parametric techniques), we have run regressions where the log of income is assumed
to have both first and second order effects on consumption, in a log quadratic version
of the Engel curve (4). In the columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, it is clearly seen that the
statistical insignificance of the quadratic coefficients reject the presence of non-linear
relationships, in line with other papers (Pissarides and Weber 1989; Hurst et al. 2011).
An interesting extension to make the estimates more reliable consists of applying
quantile regression to see whether the underreporting is sensitive to different quan-
tiles. Indeed, it may be the case that the extent of concealment to be dependant on
the conditional distribution of food expenditures. Table 7 shows how the value of θ
changes with respect to the 0.25th, 0.50th and 0.75th quantile. While the degree of
underreporting substantially increases in the comparison between the 0.25th and the
0.50th quantiles, there is an stabilization of the estimate for the last quantile. In other
words, it is found an increasing relationship between the level of underreporting and
the food expenditures: the higher the households expenditures in food, the higher their
underreporting of income. But this is only true for the two first quantiles. Beyond
the median household, this relationship disappears, following the standard pattern of
decreasing marginal propensity to consume food.13
Finally, it is reasonable to think that business cycle may impact on tax evasion and
more generally on the extent of informal economy. Although this is not the central
point of this paper, Table 8 gives some insights on this potential link for several,
13 This result is also found when other specifications (total food, income of household head) are estimated.
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Table 8 IV estimates of Engel curve for food by subperiods
ln (food) ln (total food)
2006–2007 2008–2009 2006–2007 2008–2009
ln (total income) 0.447 (0.047) 0.399 (0.041)
ln (HH income) 0.351 (0.047) 0.287 (0.038)
DSE 0.101 (0.028) 0.070 (0.024) 0.100 (0.029) 0.058 (0.026)
Age 0.036 (0.003) 0.041 (0.003) 0.032 (0.004) 0.037 (0.003)
Age2 −0.0002 (0.00003) −0.0003 (0.00003) −0.0003 (0.00004) −0.0003 (0.00003)
# Children 0.086 (0.009) 0.099 (0.007)
# Members 0.276 (0.008) 0.267 (0.006)
Marital status −0.151 (0.022) −0.143 (0.018) −0.263 (0.023) −0.239 (0.019)
Constant 3.030 (0.435) 3.499 (0.353) 3.546 3.807 (0.391)
∧
θ 1.335 1.27 1.252 1.159
−
R2 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.31
Obs. 7,132 8,963 5,969 7,506
Standard errors in parenthesis
different specifications. Contrary to what previous intuition may conjecture, the degree
of underreporting in our sample is higher in the years of expansion (2006–2007) than
when the economy shrinks (2008–2009).
5 Concluding remarks
At first sight, one could say that the extent of underreporting of income by the Spanish
self-employed workers would be above the estimates found for USA, Sweden or UK.
This view would be supported firstly by the fact that tax morale in Spain is not so strong
as in other OECD countries (Alm and Torgler 2006). And secondly, as Mediterranean
country, the Spanish self-employment rate is higher than in north European countries
(Torrini 2005), and this makes more difficult and costlier the control of such income
source by tax authorities.
This paper shows evidence on the extent of underreporting by self-employed in a
sample that has never been used with this purpose. Our estimates range this magnitude
by around 25 % of the reported income recognized by the households headed by
self-employed workers. These figures are very close to those corresponding to other
countries such as Sweden or USA. Our result has been obtained using data drawn from
the Spanish Household Budget Surveys over the period 2006–2009 and after running
a number of regressions to control for changes in specification, non-linearities and
endogeneity.
Having said that, we have proposed here a broader interpretation of the standard
Pissarides and Weber (1989) model. Instead of assuming that salary workers hon-
estly report all their incomes, we have also admitted the chance of hiding earnings by
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employees. In this context, our measure of income underreported by self-employed
workers must be interpreted as a relative extent of such concealment, taking as refer-
ence a given level of underreporting of income by the salary workers.
In other words, our estimate of 25 % of underreporting by self-employed house-
holds is in relation to the income of self-employed worker that equals the degree of
underreporting of income by salary workers, which is strictly positive in our approach.
Indeed, we see how the extent of concealment is greatly sensitive to the type of salary
worker household taken into consideration in the sample. Recall that the range of
underreporting goes from 1.111 when households with employee head also receive
pension incomes to 1.809 in the opposite case: no pension income is obtained.
Consequently, our estimates must be seen as lower bounds in the absolute extent of
underreporting of income, beyond the standard maximum and minimum thresholds
derived from the canonical approach. In this context, the extent of black economy
stemmed from the underreporting of self-employed is around 2.5 % of GDP.14 Previous
estimates of the informal economy in Spain are substantially higher than those reported
here. Arrazola et al. (2011) finds that the size of Spanish underground economy in
the 2000s is around 20 % of GDP, using both the currency demand and electricity
models. Schneider (2012) also reaches practically the same figure over the period
2003–2010. Anyway, the comparison between both of them and this paper only aims
for inserting our estimates within the general framework of previous estimates; indeed,
the methodologies are quite different and the focus is completely distinct (the whole
economy versus the underreporting by self-employed with respect to employees).
A line for further research could be motivated by the consequences of this conceal-
ment of income on tax revenues and progressivity. While the effect of progressivity on
tax evasion has been examined by some authors, the inverse effect (the impact of the
concealment of income by self-employed workers on progressivity) has hardly studied.
Although there are some theoretical papers dealing with this issue (see, for instance,
the recent paper by Freire-Seren and Panades 2008), the scope for empirical papers is
wide. Precisely on the basis of this new research avenue, it is clear that basic principles
of vertical and horizontal equity are damaged in the presence of underreporting.
Additionally, as the salary workers have to pay more taxes compared to self-
employed workers, other things equal, an inefficient incentive to allocate more
resources (than socially optimal) in the self-employment activities arises. As result
of this, individuals see how their employment choice between paid employment and
self-employment is distorted in favour of the latter.
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Appendix A: Instruments used in Table 3
• Column (1) of Table 3: dummy variable for nationality of household head, two
dummy variables indicating the education of household head (primary and post-
compulsory secondary school), and the product of self-employed dummy with
age, age squared, and the two previous schooling dummy variables.
• Column (2) of Table 3: the same than in column (1).
• Column (3) of Table 3: two dummy variables indicating the education of house-
hold head (primary and post-compulsory secondary school), and the product of
self-employed dummy with the two previous schooling dummy and compulsory
secondary school.
• Column (4) of Table 3: two dummy variables indicating the education of household
head (primary and post-compulsory secondary school), and the product of self-
employed dummy with age, age squared, and the two previous schooling dummy
variables.
Appendix B: Residual variances in income equations
See Table 9.





Model [1] 0.326 0.289
Model [2] 0.250 0.209
Model [3] 0.250 0.212
Model [4] 0.326 0.293
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